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NOTE FOR:

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Subject: Contingency Operations and Force Multiplier: The Options

I. I believe there are a number of options available on how we might proceed on handling these two topics as CIPC studies, but the most logical three are:

A. Do only one study that combines the two topics making contingency operations a subset of the force multiplier problem.

B. Do two studies that are complementary, but not redundant. This would require having the force multiplier study concentrate on NFIP support during a conventional war and beyond, while the contingency operations study stopped short of a conventional war. Once these studies were completed the CIPC virtually would have covered the role of national intelligence at all levels of conflict. In terms of CIPC studies we would have:

-Intelligence support to counterterrorism. study) 25X1

-Intelligence support to contingency operations(beyond terrorism and short of conventional war). study) 25X1

-Intelligence as a force multiplier (or, intelligence support to general warfighting capabilities). study) 25X1

C. Do two studies but focus the force multiplier study on the role of intelligence in defense planning, acquisition, and management, and not on supporting operating forces in combat. Although this is contrary to how most military writers view the concept of a force multiplier (generally an intangible quantity whose presence increases the combat effectiveness of a military force), it might be useful in tough budgetary times to demonstrate how intelligence has real peacetime value beyond keeping our decisionmakers informed about world events. Moreover, should the Soviets continue to close the technology gap, then intelligence may soon become one of the few remaining means we have of getting more bang for the buck without

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having to add more bucks. Although it would require some imagination and a major selling campaign, a useful study on this unique aspect of intelligence could be structured.

1. The first part of the study would describe why intelligence is so important to our defense posture. For example with assured warning, the US would have more time to prepare in event of a threatening situation and need not keep all forces at an increased readiness status or forward deployed. Additionally, intelligence helps in designing weapon systems by defining targets and threats, and with emerging technology by proving essential signature data so the smart weapon can tell an enemy tank from a tractor. Intelligence also helps in force planning and even in developing tactics, doctrine, and strategy: just look at the emergence of the Soviet OMG concept and its impact on planning for the defense of Europe; or, the growth of Soviet strategic mobile missiles and its impact on our strategic thinking.
2. Secondly, after establishing the importance of intelligence, the study would identify ways intelligence can make even a greater contribution to our deterrence posture. If we were really ambitious, the study might try to quantify the importance of intelligence to the defense effort.

II. Regarding the force multiplier problem, the CIPC must decide if the force multiplier concept applies to warfighting or deterrence, or both. As indicated earlier, the term force multiplier usually is associated with the battlefield, and trying to convince those in the Pentagon that it could also apply to balance of power perceptions will be hard. But, possibly no more so than doing a study about using NFIP to support military operations of any kind conducted anywhere.

III. I personally would either select B or C depending on how one reads the DCI and DDCI needs, and only at the last resort, A. No matter how we go the studies will be extremely difficult, politically sensitive (these are fundamentally defense intelligence issues), and not easily bound. In any event, before I move much farther on contingency operations, I need to know if the studies are going to be combined.

Thanks,



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